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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
JuvENILE Couars AND PRILaGED COMMUNICATIONS. - In the case of
Lindsey v. People, (Colo., ig) I8i Pac. 531, the Supreme Court of Colorado
has held that Judge Lindsey of the Juvenile Court of Denver could not refuse
to testify as to a communication made to him by a child who was at the time
of the communication suspected of crime and against whom proceedings were
later taken in the Juvenile Court. The decision was by a vote of four to three,
and a vigorous dissenting opinion was written by Justice Bailey and concurred
in by Justices Scott and Allen.
The case arose under the following circumstances: a man had been killed
and his wife was suspected of murdering him; their twelve-year-old son was
also under suspicion. The boy went to judge Lindsey's chambers in the
Juvenile Court to consult the Judge about the case and, after being assured
by the Judge that any statement made to the latter would be confidential and
that no disclosure of the same could be forced from the Judge, the boy made
a statement as to the circumstances of the killing of his father. The wife
of the deceased was later tried for the murder of her husband, and thr.boy
testified in her behalf. The prosecution then sought to show that the boy had
made a statement tq Judge Lindsey which was inconsistent with his testi-
mony at the trial, and called upon the latter to testify-as to the statement
made to him by the bo)' under the circumstances above detailed. judge Lind-
sey declined to disclose the information he had thus received, on the ground
,that the communication w-is privileged; he persisted in his refusal after the
trial court had ordered him to answer, and was found guilty of contempt of
court and fined. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the court below.
It is admitted in both the prevailing and dissenting opinions that the case
is one of first inpression; the dissenting opinion justifies the claim of privilege
by pointing out analogies to other and similar situations in which the claim
is clearly recognized; the majority opinion denies the privilege because no
clear and unmistakable basis for it is contained in the various sections of the
Colorado Statutes cited in the brief of the plaintiff in error. It is interesting
that both' opinions, in discussing the general question of privilege, rely on
Wigmore on Evidence, § 2285, where the learned author states the ruile as
follows: "(i) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3)
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the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered; (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.' It seems perfectly clear that
all of these requirements exist in the case at bar. Indeed the majority 
opin-
ion tacitly admits that all of them exist except (4), as to which it says:
"Considering the importance of the case on trial to the defendant as well 
as
the people, and the rare instances in which courts are likely to be 
confronted
with a similar situation, it appears to us beyond question that the benefit 
to
be gained by the correct disposition of the litigation was * * * infinitely
greater than any injury which could possibly inure to the relation by the dis-
closure of the communication." And it is really on this point 
that the dis-
sent rests. The majority opinion goes on to demonstrate with metricunus
refinement that the situation of the confidant in the present case is 
not pre-
cisely the same as that of an. attorney dealing with a -client, nor the 
same as
that of a public officer dealing with confidential matters communicated 
to him
officially (though on both of these points the distinctions made by the 
court
are highly technical); the opinion also holds that no relation of confidence
existed between Judge Lindsey and the boy under the provisions of the Juven-
ile Court Law because no petition had been filed and there was therefore no
case pending against the boy.
The dissenting opinion, though suggesting the close similarity 
of the attor-
ney-client and the officer-informer cases (on the latter point see the 
recent
6ase of State v. Tun', i9. Mo. App. 4o4), bases its argument on 
the conten-
tion that the Juvenile Court is established by law for the carrying out 
of an
important public duty, that it is absolutely essential to the proper 
carrying out
of such duty that there be a high degree of confidence between 
the Judge
and the children appearing before him, and that "anything which tends 
to de-
stroy the trust of the child in the court *** must necessarily nullify 
all possi-
bility of good which otherwise might * * be accomplished." It seems 
clear
that the view of the dissenting opinien is correct, and that the privilege 
claim-
ed by Judge Lindsey ought to be recognized.
The prevailing opinion is undoubtedly deserving of Justice Bailey's 
de-
scription of it as "highly technical in character, narrow in construction, 
and
little calculated to give helpful if any assistance in the enforcement 
of the
Juvenile Court Law." If the opinion had recognized the propriety 
of the
privilege contended for, and had regretted that the extension of such privi-
lege lay with the legislature and not with the court, its position might 
be
more easily accepted, though still with misgivings. Such a view was sug-
gested by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the recent case of White
Mojuntain Freezer Co. v. Murphy, 78 N. H. 398, where it was held that 
no
privilege existed in respect of communications made to a labor commissioner
(appointed under a statute providing for the arbitration of labor disputes)
previous to a strike which became the subject of litigation. It is 
interesting
to note that the New Hampshire legislature has since passed a statute 
(Laws
x917, c. 142, § i) providing that such communications shall not be admissible
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in evidence. But the majority opinionin the instant case does not even admit
that the privilege ought to extend to such communications; it contends rather
that the privilege should not exist, because it might tend to prevent the dis-
closure of facts which, the court felt, should have been disclosed in this par-
ticular instance. In this it ignores the considerations of public policy which
have led to the almost universal recognition of all' the phases of privileged
communication, and also ignores the weighty reasons based on the peculiar
requirement of confidence in the successful working out of the juvenile
Court Law. It is to be hoped that the Colorado legislature will soon repair
the damage done by this decision. E. H.
